# Case

Begos 12 (Kevin Begos, AP, Aug 17, 2012, “AP IMPACT: CO2 emissions in US drop to 20-year low”, <http://news.yahoo.com/ap-impact-co2-emissions-us-drop-20-low-174616030--finance.html>)

In a little-noticed technical report, the U.S. Energy Information Agency, a part of the Energy Department, said this month that energy related U.S. CO2 emissions for the first four months of this year fell to about 1992 levels. Energy emissions make up about 98 percent of the total. The Associated Press contacted environmental experts, scientists and utility companies and learned that virtually everyone believes the shift could have major long-term implications for U.S. energy policy. While conservation efforts, the lagging economy and greater use of renewable energy are factors in the CO2 decline, the drop-off is due mainly to low-priced natural gas, the agency said. A frenzy of shale gas drilling in the Northeast's Marcellus Shale and in Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana has caused the wholesale price of natural gas to plummet from $7 or $8 per unit to about $3 over the past four years, making it cheaper to burn than coal for a given amount of energy produced. As a result, utilities are relying more than ever on gas-fired generating plants. Both government and industry experts said the biggest surprise is how quickly the electric industry turned away from coal. In 2005, coal was used to produce about half of all the electricity generated in the U.S. The Energy Information Agency said that fell to 34 percent in March, the lowest level since it began keeping records nearly 40 years ago. The question is whether the shift is just one bright spot in a big, gloomy picture, or a potentially larger trend. Coal and energy use are still growing rapidly in other countries, particularly China, and CO2 levels globally are rising, not falling. Moreover, changes in the marketplace — a boom in the economy, a fall in coal prices, a rise in natural gas — could stall or even reverse the shift. For example, U.S. emissions fell in 2008 and 2009, then rose in 2010 before falling again last year. Also, while natural gas burns cleaner than coal, it still emits some CO2. And drilling has its own environmental consequences, which are not yet fully understood. "Natural gas is not a long-term solution to the CO2 problem," Pielke warned. The International Energy Agency said the U.S. has cut carbon dioxide emissions more than any other country over the last six years. Total U.S. carbon emissions from energy consumption peaked at about 6 billion metric tons in 2007. Projections for this year are around 5.2 billion, and the 1990 figure was about 5 billion. China's emissions were estimated to be about 9 billion tons in 2011, accounting for about 29 percent of the global total. The U.S. accounted for approximately 16 percent. Mann called it "ironic" that the shift from coal to gas has helped bring the U.S. closer to meeting some of the greenhouse gas targets in the 1997 Kyoto treaty on global warming, which the United States never ratified. On the other hand, leaks of methane from natural gas wells could be pushing the U.S. over the Kyoto target for that gas.

Externalize on to other countries

# I

Neoliberal governmentality ensures war, disease, and environmental collapse- economic decision-making views people as a disposable resource for producing capital, only stepping outside this frame for politics can avert extinction

Giroux 6 (Henry A. Giroux currently holds the Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in Canada. “Dirty Democracy and State Terrorism: The Politics of the New Authoritarianism in the United States,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 26.2 (2006) 163-177.)

While it would be ludicrous to suggest that the United States either represents a mirror image of fascist ideology or mimics the systemic racialized terror of Nazi Germany, it is not unreasonable, as Hannah Arendt urged in The Origins of Totalitarianism, to learn to recognize how different elements of fascism crystallize in different historical periods into new forms of authoritarianism. Such antidemocratic elements combine in often unpredictable ways, and I believe they can be found currently in many of the political practices, values, and policies that [End Page 164] characterize U.S. sovereignty under the Bush administration. Unchecked power at the top of the political hierarchy is increasingly matched by an aggressive attack on dissent throughout the body politic and fuels both a war abroad and a war at home. The economic and militaristic powers of global capital – spearheaded by U.S. corporations and political interests – appear uncurbed by traditional forms of national and international sovereignty, the implications of which are captured in David Harvey's serviceable phrase "accumulation by dispossession." Entire populations are now seen as disposable, marking a dangerous moment for the promise of a global democracy.8 The discourse of liberty, equality, and freedom that emerged with modernity seems to have lost even its residual value as the central project of democracy. State sovereignty is no longer organized around the struggle for life but an insatiable quest for the accumulation of capital, leading to what Achille Mbembe calls "necropolitics," or the destruction of human bodies**.**9 War, violence, and death have become the principal elements shaping the biopolitics of the new authoritarianism that is emerging in the United States and increasingly extending its reach into broader global spheres, from Iraq to a vast array of military outposts and prisons around the world. As the state of emergency, in Giorgio Agamben's aptly chosen words, becomes the rule rather than the exception, a number of powerful antidemocratic tendencies threaten the prospects for both American and global democracy.10 The first is a market fundamentalism that not only trivializes democratic values and public concerns but also enshrines a rabid individualism, an all-embracing quest for profits, and a social Darwinism in which misfortune is seen as a weakness—the current sum total being the Hobbesian rule of a "war of all against all" that replaces any vestige of shared responsibilities or compassion for others. The values of the market and the ruthless workings of finance capital become the template for organizing the rest of society. Everybody is now a customer or client, and every relationship is ultimately judged in bottom-line, cost-effective terms as the neoliberal mantra "privatize or perish" is repeated over and over again. Responsible citizens are replaced by an assemblage of entrepreneurial subjects, each tempered in the virtue of self-reliance and forced to face the increasingly difficult challenges of the social order alone. Freedom is no longer about securing equality, social justice, or the public welfare but about unhampered trade in goods, financial capital, and commodities. As the logic of capital trumps democratic sovereignty, low-intensity warfare at home chips away at democratic freedoms, and high-intensity warfare abroad delivers democracy with bombs, tanks, and chemical warfare. The global cost of these neoliberal commitments is massive human suffering and death, delivered not only in the form of bombs and the barbaric practices of occupying armies but also in structural adjustment policies in which the drive for land, resources, profits, and goods are implemented by global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Global lawlessness and armed violence accompany the imperative of free trade, the virtues of a market without boundaries, and the promise of a Western-style democracy imposed through military solutions, ushering in the age of rogue sovereignty on a global scale. Under such conditions, human suffering and hardship reach unprecedented levels of intensity. In a rare moment of truth, Thomas Friedman, the columnist for the New York Times, precisely argued for the use of U.S. power—including military force—to support this antidemocratic world order. He claimed that "the hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist. . . . And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies to flourish is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps."11 As Mark Rupert points out, "In Friedman's twisted world, if people are to realize their deepest aspirations—the longing for a better life which comes from their very souls—they must stare down the barrel of [End Page 165] Uncle Sam's gun."12 As neoliberals in the Bush administration implement policies at home to reduce taxation and regulation while spending billions on wars abroad, they slash funds that benefit the sick, the elderly, the poor, and young people. But public resources are diverted not only from crucial domestic problems ranging from poverty and unemployment to hunger; they are also diverted from addressing the fate of some 45 million children in "the world's poor countries [who] will die needlessly over the next decade," as reported by the British-based group Oxfam.13 The U.S. commitment to market fundamentalism elevates profits over human needs and consequently offers few displays of compassion, aid, or relief for millions of poor and abandoned children in the world who do not have adequate shelter, who are severely hungry, who have no access to health care or safe water, and who succumb needlessly to the ravages of AIDS and other diseases.14 For instance, as Jim Lobe points out, "U.S. foreign aid in 2003 ranked dead last among all wealthy nations. In fact, its entire development aid spending in 2003 came to only ten percent of what it spent on the Iraq war that year. U.S. development assistance comes to less than one-fortieth of its annual defense budget."15 Carol Bellamy, the executive director of UNICEF, outlines the consequences of the broken promises to children by advanced capitalist countries such as the United States. She writes, Today more than one billion children are suffering extreme deprivations from poverty, war, and HIV/AIDS. The specifics are staggering: 640 million children without adequate shelter, 400 million children without access to safe water, and 270 million children without access to basic health services. AIDS has orphaned 15 million children. During the 1990s alone, war forced 20 million children to leave their homes.16

# AT: Taylor

**Taylor’s article about lower atmospheric warming is flawed**

**Nuccitelli 12** (Dana Nuccitelli, environmental scientist at a private environmental consulting firm in the Sacramento, California area. He has a Bachelor's Degree in astrophysics from the University of California at Berkeley, and a Master's Degree in physics from the University of California at Davis, “Skepticism About Lower Atmosphere Temperature Data,” 1/8/12) <http://www.skepticalscience.com/news.php?n=1198>

Note: This article was submitted to Forbes as a correction to the op-ed by James Taylor in question, but Forbes declined to publish it, so instead we're posting it here. Forbes recently published an op-ed written by James Taylor of the Heartland Institute on the subject of the University of Alabama at Huntsville (UAH) atmospheric temperature measurements on the record's 33rd anniversary. Unfortunately, the article contained a litany of errors which completely undermine its conclusions, and exhibited a distinct lack of true skepticism. The main subject of the article was the fact that according to climate models, the Earth's lower atmosphere should warm approximately 20% faster than the surface, whereas UAH estimates place the lower atmosphere warming at about 20% less than surface temperature measurements. A true skeptic would acknowledge that there are three possible explanations for this discrepancy: The models are incorrect and the lower atmosphere should not warm faster than the surface. The surface temperature estimates are biased high, showing more warming than is actually occurring. The UAH lower atmosphere temperature estimates are biased low, showing less warming than is actually occurring. Because the climate model expectation of greater lower atmosphere warming is based on solid fundamental atmospheric physics, and the accuracy of the surface temperature record was recently independently confirmed by Richard Muller and the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature (BEST) project, the third possible explanation appears to be the most likely. This possibility is further supported by the fact that other groups have estimated greater atmospheric warming than UAH, and measurements by radiosondes (instruments on weather balloons) also show greater atmospheric warming than UAH. It is certainly a possiblity that is worth considering, and yet it was notably absent from the three possible explanations for the model-data discrepancy provided by James Taylor in his article. In fact, every one of the three possible explanations offered by Taylor involved the [hu]man-made global warming theory being either exaggerated or incorrect. Refusing to consider a possibility which is inconvenient for one's pre-conceived notions and/or biases reveals a distinct lack of true skepticism. Taylor's article contained a litany of additional errors. For example, he reported that the UAH temperature data "seem to show warming closer to 0.3 degrees over the 33 year period, or 0.09 degrees Celsius per decade," as opposed to the UAH-reported 0.14°C per decade warming. This is false. John Christy reported that if the influences of volcanic eruptions (which have a temporary cooling effect by releasing particulates into the atmosphere which block sunlight) are filtered out of the UAH record, the warming trend is reduced to 0.09°C per decade. However, in order to make an apples-to-apples comparison, the volcanic influence must also be removed from the climate models, which neither Christy nor Taylor did. Additionally, a recent study by Foster and Rahmstorf filtered out the effects of not just volcanic eruptions, but also the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and solar activity, which can also have significant short-term impacts on global temperatures. They confirmed Christy's finding that removing volcanic effects decreases the warming trend over the past three decades, but additionally removing ENSO and solar influences increases the trend over that same period. In other words, by only removing the influence of volcanoes, Christy and Taylor cherrypicked the effect which would minimize the observed warming trend. This again exhibits a distinct lack of true skepticism. Taylor also implied that unlike surface temperature measurements, the UAH satellite data do not "require guesswork corrections." In reality, the UAH record requires a great number of corrections, because the satellite instruments do not even directly measure atmospheric temperatures. Rather, they measure the intensity of microwave radiation given off by oxygen molecules in the atmosphere, from which the scientists estimate the temperature. The satellites sensors face down toward the Earth and radiation therefore reaches the satellites having travelled upwards through a warming lower atmosphere and cooling upper atmosphere. This influences any warming signal received by the satellites, and because the lower atmosphere is what is being measured. creates a cooling bias that has to be accounted for. But it doesn't end there; bias also exists between the various instrument sensors on each satellite, and the satellite orbits decay over time. These and a number of other obstacles mean a lot of careful and painstaking analysis is required. As a result of all this complexity and data correction, there's much that can go wrong. Considering these challenges, it's not a surprise that there have been a number of major corrections to the satellite temperature data over the years. Groups outside of UAH identified two major errors in the UAH analysis, both of which had caused Spencer and Christy to significantly underestimate the atmospheric warming. Despite the difficulties in the available data, and the numerous adjustments made to their analysis, Spencer and Christy have all along insisted that their data set is correct, and they (and James Taylor) continue with this overconfidence today. However, the most likely explanation for UAH showing less warming than models and atmospheric physics predict is that UAH is biased low. Taylor's error-riddled article demonstrates that when it comes to climate science, we should listen to climate scientists, who are true skeptics, rather than a law and policy expert from a fossil fuel-funded think tank. Rather than correct the errors by publishing this article, Forbes compounded the problem by publishing a very similarly erroneous post from serial misinformer Patrick Michaels (who admits that like Taylor, he is also heavily fossil fuel-funded). Ironically, Forbes recently published Peter Gleick's 2011 Climate B.S.\* of the Year Awards. If Forbes continue with this trend of publishing and compounding misinformation while ignoring corrections, perhaps they will make a run for the 2012 award!

# 2AC Cap Good

Neoliberalism is dead – that’s Schreiner – the only choice is between the authoritarian market ethic of the Tea Party and Occupy

The current crisis has shaken neoliberal economics at the core – the status quo leads to system-wide collapse and extinction

Öniş and Güven 11 (Ziya Öniş is professor of international relations and director of the Center for Research on Globalization and Democratic Governance (GLODEM) at Koç University. Ali Burak Güven is GLODEM research fellow in the Department of International Relations at Koç University. “The Global Economic Crisis and the Future of Neoliberal Globalization: Rupture Versus Continuity.” *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, October 2011, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 469-488.

This article highlights the major elements of rupture and continuity in the global political economy since the onset of the crisis. Our starting point is that the crisis poses a fundamental challenge to the project of neoliberal globalization—the worldwide process of reorganizing economic activity on the principle of intensified interaction and interdependence between increasingly open and liberalized national markets, which has received ample endorsement from business and policy elites in both the global North and most countries of the global South for the past three decades. It is noteworthy that the present crisis is not the first material challenge to this project. Neoliberal globalism was already put to a tough test during the string of financial meltdowns that engulfed the semi-periphery in the 1990s. These episodes accelerated the paradigm reorientation toward a more social and regulatory system among some supporters of this project and were met with corresponding efforts to redesign emerging market economies, but their lessons were by and large ignored in the global North and had little impact on the workings of the international economy. The contemporary crisis is different from that earlier volley of warning shots in its system-wide character and consequences. It represents the biggest disruption to the postwar international economic order, and brings into relief a large constellation of factors that shape current efforts to put things back together both within national economies and for the system itself. As numerous as they may be, we believe most of these factors connect to two interrelated themes: the problems within and relationships between rival models of capitalism; and the evolving structure of and challenges to global governance. From the perspective of these two themes, many of the ruptures frequently associated with the crisis appear as accelerations and aggravations of existing trends rather than brand new phenomena, such as the rise of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, China, India) countries, chronic problems besetting both the Anglo-American free market and the European social market models, and the quest for stronger and more representative global governance mechanisms. Likewise, continuities prove more dynamic than static, as in new variations of conflicts of interest between leading and emerging powers complicating global policy coordination, evolving channels of elite and popular resistance to policy change in various regions, and the lack of alternatives to existing multilateral financing bodies amid changes in lending framework and priorities. The general point is that the crisis is accelerating the drive toward a multipolar globalization riding on a more heterodox neoliberalism. Even then, the neoliberal globalist project will survive in the medium term, but probably in modified form and in a less propitious environment that accentuates its contradictions. The fundamental challenge here is the difficulty of attaining effective global policy coordination on key matters, particularly in the absence of sufficiently powerful multilateral institutions with a meaningful degree of autonomy from nation-states. Our conclusion is therefore somewhat bleak. Without deep coordination on a broad range of interconnected issues, there is little hope not only for resolving the pressing global problems of the day, such as a self-destructive international financial architecture and the unfolding environmental catastrophe, but even for defending some modest democratic and developmental gains of the past two decades. FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CORE: CRISES OF NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION Especially in media reports, but in scholarly debates as well, there is a popular tendency to treat the contemporary crisis as the first major challenge to neoliberal globalization. This provides a hardly convincing storyline as it fails to acknowledge the long list of financial tragedies in the semi-periphery between the mid-1990s and early 2000s. These crises bore a striking genetic resemblance to the current emergency as they too originated from a faulty belief in the self-regulating properties of integrated markets, caused much human suffering, and in turn had important normative and international policy repercussions, some broadly similar to those that are in ascendance today. There are of course significant differences between these prior turbulences and the present one, particularly in terms of the specific mix of the national and the global in their causes as well as consequences. Still, revisiting that past experience, the crucial lessons of which were obviously unheeded by policymakers in advanced economies, allows for a more accurate historical outlook. The crises of neoliberal globalization in the semi-periphery started with the Turkish and Mexican financial shocks in 1994, continued with the devastating Asian Crisis of 1997, reached full steam during the Russian and Brazilian meltdowns of 1998 and 1999 respectively, and came to an end with the collapse of Turkish and Argentine economies in 2001. When these episodes are treated as a specific marker in the evolution of neoliberal globalization, the preceding one and a half decades also emerge as a unique phase in itself. The period from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s witnessed the emergence, diffusion and consolidation of the neoliberal globalist project. 1 Never in history had so many countries from such varied starting points simultaneously attempted to reorganize their economies along similar principles. The ‘mixed economies’ of the Third World, the coordinated and interventionist systems of Western Europe, and the postsocialist countries of the former Soviet Bloc were all encouraged to follow the Anglo-American example in embracing free market internationalism as the surest path to national prosperity and, coincidentally, global peace. But while liberalization and market integration did seem to help the recovery from the stagnation of the 1970s and the early 1980s for most countries in the North, the euphoria waned rapidly in the global South. A key problem was the lackluster record of market reforms in much of the developing world, particularly in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa where IMF and World Bank-inspired restructuring often resulted in deteriorating growth rates (Easterly, 2003; Vreeland, 2003). The financial crises in the semi-periphery in the 1990s intensified the already growing scepticism about orthodox policies of domestic liberalization and international integration by exposing some of their less predictable perils. The basic mechanism behind these crises was similar to the present one. Invariably, they followed from an unruly integration with global financial markets, made possible by radical domestic financial liberalization and hasty capital account liberalization. In the absence of strong precautionary mechanisms, exposure to highly volatile and speculative capital flows resulted in the accumulation of deep macroeconomic imbalances in each instance, eventually triggering devastating financial crises followed by economy-wide recessions. Another similarity was in the social outcome of the crisis. As in the present context, the benefits of neoliberal globalization had accrued disproportionately in many of these economies, often leading to deteriorations in income equality that placed popular classes under significant stress. In the end, these crises forced policymakers in the semi-periphery to tackle much the same challenges their counterparts in the global North are facing today: reining in an underregulated financial sector through institutional improvements in financial governance while taking protective measures to minimize the social fallout of the crisis. The financial turmoil of this period was a key factor in the normative shift away from orthodox neoliberalism in the mainstream development community. Starting from the mid1990s, but especially after the Asian Crisis, international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and the World Bank began advocating a more social, regulatory, and pragmatic neoliberalism, often labelled the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC). Rather than extolling the virtues of self-regulating markets, they now emphasized the need for cultivating good governance, building strong regulatory arrangements, and adopting pro-poor growth strategies through sweeping domestic institutional reforms. 2 This agenda has been implemented unevenly across the developing world, partly as a result of declining IFI presence especially in middleincome countries (MICs) in the 2000s. However, its message for caution was taken seriously on the regulatory front as numerous emerging market countries moved to reduce their vulnerability to the vagaries of global financial markets by tightening their banking regimes and quite often by accumulating large international reserves. The growing awareness in the semi-periphery about the perils of neoliberal globalization was not shared as strongly in advanced economies. Surely there did emerge multilateral initiatives to guard against future financial trouble in the system, such as the establishment in 1999 of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), a platform that brought together G-7 countries and key international financial and regulatory organizations for promoting basic universal standards in various areas including banking and insurance supervision, fiscal transparency, auditing, data dissemination, corporate governance, and so on. One problem with this effort was the slow and piecemeal adoption of these standards in the developing world (Mosley, 2009: 10-2), including instances of “mock compliance” (Walter, 2008). A bigger problem was that they were designed to pre-empt risks in shallow and relatively simple financial markets in emerging countries by advocating the emulation of ‘best practices’ in major states, especially in the US. Yet those practices were themselves growing incapable of comprehending and insuring against new hazards generated by massive, increasingly complex and highly innovative financial markets in the North. In fact, the regulatory threshold in the US was lowered substantially with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which, by blurring the distinction between commercial and investment banks, opened the gates to the rapid growth in the market share of highly risky financial instruments in subsequent years. Meanwhile the Basel II Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the standard-setting body for the industry, introduced in 2004 new capital requirements that relied heavily on banks’ own internal risk assessments at the expense of universal criteria imposed by public authorities, echoing an everincreased confidence in the self-regulatory capabilities of market players. Why did not the crises of neoliberal globalization in the semi-periphery trigger greater regulatory vigilance across the system? One reason, of course, was continued “regulatory capture” by financial interests in the North through political lobbying, normative influence, and the chronic flow of executives between public office and the private sector (Baker, 2010). A more important factor could be found in the nature and aftermath of these crises. These were primarily national and regional failures with secondary systemic repercussions. While producing strong contagion effects (such as the quick spread of the Thai currency meltdown to other Asian economies in 1997, and the Brazilian and Russian crises aggravating subsequent episodes in Turkey and Argentina), they still fell short of destabilizing the system as a whole. Furthermore, the quick recovery from these turbulences ushered in an era of prosperity for the world economy characterized by a record expansion in trade volume, abundant liquidity and foreign direct investment, and respectable growth rates in every region. With the global economy in high gear between 2002 and 2007, calls for regulatory upgrading in major states and stronger cross-border financial governance did not carry much weight. The current catastrophe, the crisis of neoliberal globalization at the core, concludes this brief age of optimism. In its causes and reach, and as different from the antecedent troubles in the semi-periphery, it is primarily a systemic crisis with national dimensions. In the background of the US asset price bubble were not only grave failures of domestic regulation, but perhaps more crucially the “global imbalances” between surplus economies such as Germany and China and deficit countries such as the US and the UK, locking in finance-led and debt-driven growth patterns in the latter (Eichengreen, 2006). Meanwhile the depth and the reach of the crisis owes much to an international financial architecture that rewards rent-seeking and speculative behaviour without offering effective failsafes against the transmission of risk (Crotty, 2009). Fixing these structural problems is an incomparably more difficult task than putting derailed market transitions in the semi-periphery back on track at a forgiving international economic conjuncture. It requires, first, a fundamental rethinking of economic models in advanced countries, and, second, much tighter and enduring coordination between major economies, some now outside the Northern core. On both counts there have been ambitious efforts over the past couple of years, yet with modest achievements so far. A BRAVE NEW WORLD? The crisis has instigated two important shifts in the global economy. First, it has greatly undermined Northern models of capitalism, specifically the Anglo-American liberal market model and the continental European social (and coordinated) market economies, 3 provoking substantive attempts by policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to repair their broken systems. Second, it has produced an unprecedented drive for policy coordination and collective response among major states, with important changes in existing platforms of global governance. Originating in the US, the crisis has posed the greatest challenge to the Anglo-American liberal market system. The proximate cause of the catastrophe, the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market by mid-2007, provides the interesting story of how a concerted project of profitably reintegrating marginalized masses into a free market society through elaborate financial trickery failed spectacularly. 4 Aggravated by other factors such as faulty monetary policy decisions, the unravelling of this project with tragic human costs has brought to the surface the fallacy of two fundamental assumptions underlying the liberal market model. First, the presumed efficiency of self-regulating markets proved to be an illusion. Without proper public supervision and coordination markets do not behave prudently but harbor system-wide destructive tendencies. Second, the virtue of state minimalism in social and industrial policy has been called into question. It seems increasingly impossible for the US to retain its global competitiveness and level of human development without a renewed public commitment to industrial transformation and upgrading, and redoubling of state intervention in social sectors such as health care and education. Markets, in short, have failed to compensate for the multiple coordinative and social vacuums created by the Reagan/Thatcher revolutions. After nearly 30 years of experimentation, policymakers in the US and to some extent the UK are being forced back to the drawing board.

The market is merely a vehicle for corporate control and first world consolidation of resources – their claims that the market promotes freedom ignore the billions across the globe trapped in abject poverty

McChesney ’99 (Robert, Prof. of Comms @ U of Illinois, Noam Chomsky and the Struggle Against Neoliberalism, *Monthly Review*, April 1, 1999, <http://www.chomsky.info/onchomsky/19990401.htm>)

Chomsky may also be the leading critic of the mythology of the natural "free" market, that cheery hymn that is pounded into our heads about how the economy is competitive, rational, efficient, and fair. As Chomsky points out, markets are almost never competitive. Most of the economy is dominated by massive corporations with tremendous control over their markets and which therefore face precious little competition of the sort described in economics textbooks and politicians' speeches. Moreover, corporations themselves are effectively totalitarian organizations, operating along nondemocratic lines. That our economy is centered around such institutions severely compromises our ability to have a democratic society. The mythology of the free market also submits that governments are inefficient institutions that should be limited, so as not to hurt the magic of the natural laissez faire market. In fact, as Chomsky emphasizes, governments are central to the modern capitalist system. They lavishly subsidize corporations and work to advance corporate interests on numerous fronts. The same corporations that exult in neoliberal ideology are in fact often hypocritical: they want and expect governments to funnel tax dollars to them, and to protect their markets from competition for them, but they want to be assured that governments will not tax them or work supportively on behalf of non-business interests, especially the poor and working class. Governments are bigger than ever, but under neoliberalism they have far less pretense to addressing non-corporate interests. Nowhere is the centrality of governments and policymaking more apparent than in the emergence of the global market economy. What is presented by pro-business ideologues as the natural expansion of free markets across borders is, in fact, quite the opposite. Globalization is the result of powerful governments, especially that of the United States, pushing trade deals and other accords down the throats of the world's people to make it easier for corporations and the wealthy to dominate the economies of nations around the world without having obligations to the peoples of those nations. Nowhere is the process more apparent than in the creation of the World Trade Organization in the early 1990s and, now, in the secret deliberations on behalf of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).

# AT: NS

Kysar 8 (Douglas A. Kysar, Professor of Law, Yale University, June 1, 2008, “The Consultants' Republic”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 121 Issue 8, p2041-2084, 44p)

As Pierre Schlag has noted, deconstruction cannot be selectively deployed; it “must start everywhere at once.”91 Nor can it be reduced to a mere instrumentality, tucked alongside history, sociology, welfare economics, rhetoric, and other components of a pragmatic policy “toolbox.” Such a reduction would ensure that the instrument could be deployed by any interest, for any purpose: “If traditional legal discourse succeeds in transforming deconstruction into just another technique, just another theory, just another method for making arguments, then deconstruction will have no particular politics — which is to say that it will have the conservative effect of preserving the politics of the status quo.”92 Nordhaus and Shellenberger do not recognize this selfundermining aspect of their proposal. They argue that “[wjhat’s needed today is a politics that seeks authority not from Nature or Science but from a compelling vision of the future that is appropriate for the world we live in and the crises we face” (p. 142). Yet they fail to acknowledge that our understanding of “the world we live in and the crises we face” has been mediated through the very concepts and categories they aim to jettison. To embrace postmodernism and deconstruction only in an effort to better “frame” environmentalism is to expose the movement to the superior marketing of any other psycho-linguistic huckster. To promote the idea that postmodernism and deconstruction legitimate a kind of sloppiness about meaning is to give in to, indeed to affirmatively embrace, a politics of manipulation. Environmentalists on Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s approach would be left not with a politics, but a pornography of possibility, in which virtually any policy aim could be packaged and marketed to activate virtually any cultural worldview: Clear Skies. Healthy Forests.

# 2AC Framework

Counterinterp: pedagogy is a form of affirmation. The role of the ballot is to endorse the team which best activates our political agency as debaters

Debate is not just a meaningless game – it can be a microcosm of what we hope politics can become – Giroux indicates that debate can prefigure change, not just discuss it

Resolved is to reduce by mental analysis, Random House 11 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve)

Should indicates desirability, OED 11 (http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/should?region=us)

USFG = the people

Howard, 2005 (Adam, “Jeffersonian Democracy: Of the People, By the People, For the People,” http://www.byzantinecommunications.com/adamhoward/homework/highschool/jeffersonian.html, 5/27)

Ideally, then, under Jeffersonian Democracy, the government is the people, and people is the government. Therefore, if a particular government ceases to work for the good of the people, the people may and ought to change that government or replace it. Governments are established to protect the people's rights using the power they get from the people.

Substantially is : being largely but not wholly that which is specified <a substantial lie> Merriam Webster 11

We reduce p rest. Increase financial incent

T no aprori

The energy regime inscribes a consumption-obsessed neoliberal subjectivity which causes extinction – that’s Glover – ecopedagogy is only way to reclaim our agency.

We’re key to half the topic – renewables are unworkable under the demands of the current energy regime – that’s Byrne

Academic debate is being dismantled by casino capitalism – internal link turns all their standards – that’s Giroux

Reasonability – voting aff doesn’t eradicate policy debate – we just have to prove that we’re acceptable

Aff choice – burden of rejoinder means the negative needs to actually answer our arguments – anything else is regressively anti-educational

# 2AC Curriculum

Their ev all terrible doesn’t support their model of debate

Content-learning disintction is stupid – narrow view of instrumental schooling that Giroux critiques

The curriculum has been coopted by violent neoliberal forces – debate key

Hill 10 (Dave Hill is professor of education policy at the University of Northampton, England, and professor of education at Middlesex University, London, England. 2010. *Revolutionizing Pedagogy: Education for Social Justice Within and Beyond Global Neo-Liberalism*. Eds. Sheila Macrine, Peter McLaren, and Dave Hill, pp. 135-138)

Impacts on Democracy and on Critical Thinking The neoconservative faces of education reform, indeed, of the wider marketization and commodification of humanity and society, come to play in the enforcement and policing of consent, the de-legitimizing of deep dissent, and the weakening of oppositional centers and practices and thought. In eras of declining capital accumulation, an ultimately inevitable process, capital—and the governments and parties and generals and CEOs who act at their behest—more and more nakedly ratchet up the ideological and repressive state apparatuses of control (see also Hill, 2001, 2003, 2004b, 2006b, and 2007). Thus, key working class organizations such as trade unions and democratically elected municipal governments are marginalized, and their organizations, and those of other radically oppositional organizations based on race, ethnicity, religion, are attacked through laws, rhetoric, and, ultimately, sometimes by incarceration. In education, the combined neoliberal-neoconservative educational reform has led to a radical change in what governments and most school and college managements/leaderships themselves see as their mission. In the 1960s and 1970s (and with long prior histories), liberal-humanist or social democratic or socialist ends of education were common through the advanced capitalist (and parts of the anticolonialist developing) worlds. This has changed dramatically within the lifetimes of those over thirty. Now the curriculum is conservative and it is controlled. Now the hidden curriculum of pedagogy is performative processing and “delivery” or pre-digested points. Now the overwhelming and nakedly overriding and exclusive focus is on the production of a differentially educated, tiered (raced and gendered) social class workforce and compliant citizenry. Differentially skilled and socially/politically/culturally neutered and compliant human capital is now the production focus of neoliberalized education systems and institutions, hand in glove with and enforced by a Neoconservative ideology and state. Resistance But there is resistance; there are spaces, disarticulations, and contradictions (see for example, Jones, Cunchillos, Hatcher and Hirtt, 2007; and Hill, 2009b). There are people who want to realize a different vision of education. There are people who want a more human and more equal society, a society where students and citizens and workers are not sacrificed on the altar of profit before all else. And there are always, sometimes minor, sometimes major, awakenings that the material conditions of existence, for teacher educators, teacher, students, and workers and families more widely, simply do not match or recognize the validity of neoliberal or neoconservative or other capitalist discourse and policy. Cultural Workers as Critical Egalitarian Transformative Intellectuals and the Politics of Cultural/Educational Transformation What influence can critical librarians, information workers, cultural workers, teachers, pedagogues have in working toward a democratic, egalitarian society/economy/polity? How much autonomy from state suppression and control do/can state apparatuses and their workers—such as librarians, teachers, lecturers, youth workers, have in capitalist states such as England and Wales, or the United States? Don’t they get slapped down, brought into line, controlled, or sat upon when they start getting dangerous, when they start getting a constituency/having an impact? When their activities are deemed by the capitalist class and the client states and governments of/for capital to be injurious to the interests of (national or international) capital? The repressive cards within the ideological state apparatuses are stacked against the possibilities of transformative change through the state apparatuses and their agents. But historically and internationally, this often has been the case. Spaces do exist for counter-hegemonic struggle—sometimes (as in the 1980s and 1990s) narrower, sometimes (as in the 1960s and 1970s and currently) broader. By itself, divorced from other arenas of progressive struggle, its success, the success of radical librarians, cultural workers, media workers, education workers will be limited. This necessitates the development of proactive debate both by and within the Radical Left. But it necessitates more than that; it calls for direct engagement with liberal, social democratic, and Radical Right ideologies and programs, including New Labour’s, in all the areas of the state and of civil society, in and through all the ideological and repressive state apparatuses, and in and through organizations and movements seeking a democratic egalitarian economy, polity, and society. It takes courage, what Gramsci called “civic courage.” It is often difficult. Some of our colleagues/comrades/companeras/companeras/political and organizational coworkers ain’t exactly easy to get along with. Neither are most managements; especially those infected with the curse of “new public managerialism,” the authoritarian managerialist, brutalist style of management and (anti-) human relations, where “bosses know best” and “don’t you dare step outa line, buddy!” But I want here to modify the phrase “better to die on your feet than live on your knees.” It is of course better to live on your/our feet than live on your/our knees. And whether it is millions on the streets defending democratic and workers’ rights (such as over pensions, in Britain and elsewhere, or opposing state sell-offs of publicly owned services, in France and elsewhere, or laws attacking workers’ rights, in Italy and Australia and elsewhere)—all in the last two years—or in defense of popular socialist policies in Venezuela, Bolivia, Honduras, Nepal, we are able, in solidarity, and with political aims and organization, not only to stand/live on our feet, but to march with them, to have not just an individual impact, but a mass/massive impact. We have a three-way choice—to explicitly support the neoliberalization and commodification and capitalization of society; to be complicit, through our silence and inaction, in its rapacious and antihuman/antisocial development, or to explicitly oppose it. To live on our feet and use them and our brains, words, and actions to work and move with others for a more human, egalitarian, socially just, economically just, democratic, socialist society: in that way we maintain our dignity and hope.

An imposed top-down curriculum can only be anti-democratic

Smyth 10 (John Smyth is a research professor of education at the University of Ballarat. 2010. *Revolutionizing Pedagogy: Education for Social Justice Within and Beyond Global Neo-Liberalism*. Eds. Sheila Macrine, Peter McLaren, and Dave Hill, pp. 191-192)

Teachers need to be political actors in their educational settings by being clear about the different ways in which they experience their work—how they encounter it, how they understand it, and how they feel about it (Ginsburg, 1988, p. 363). Adopting a political stance to one’s work does not mean being a political partisan; it involves what Popkewitz (1987) describes as “critical intellectual work.” Here, “critical” means moving outside the assumptions and practices of the existing order, and struggling to make categories, assumptions, and practices of everyday life problematic (p. 350). But, as Ginsburg (1988) argues, it is more than just problematizing the work of teaching because it involves “struggle to challenge and transform the structural and cultural features we . . . come to understand as oppressive and anti-democratic” (pp. 363–365). Ginsburg’s point is that teachers need to see themselves as actively participating in progressive movements committed to bringing about fundamental social change (Anyon, 2005). According to this view, the image of teachers as compliant, passive, and easily molded workers is replaced by a view of the teacher “as an active agent, constructing perspectives and choosing actions” (Feiman-Nemser and Floden, 1986, p. 523). The construal of teaching as a form of intellectual labor would have one regard teachers’ own classrooms and schools as sites of serious inquiry, with questions being asked and answered as to what schooling is about, how it works for some students, and what conditions act to exclude others. This view of teaching is political in the sense that teachers do not take the nature of their work for granted (see Carlson and Apple, 1998); they are prepared to question how it came to be that way and what sustains and maintains this set of views. This has several dramatic and direct implications for students. The most obvious is a bringing of student lives, perspectives, cultures, and experiences into the center of curriculum in a way that involves students as coconstructors and cocreators (rather than passive consumers) of that curriculum, along with teachers. This preparedness of teachers and schools to take students’ lives seriously means that the hierarchically scripted curriculum has to be modified (if not totally jettisoned) in order to accommodate the storied and narrative representations of the way students lead their increasingly complex lives (see, e.g., Ayers, Hunt, and Quinn, 1998). This undermining means that issues previously off limits will have to be brought to center stage and confronted in the classroom, issues such as racism, homophobia, gender, violence, poverty, and economic exploitation. It will also mean that students will be more prominent, through, for example, researching the contexts and communities in which they live, unmasking questions that are usually marginalized or pushed off the social and educational agenda of schooling. Thus, as teachers embrace the political in their work, a fundamental shift will occur in the direction of genuine sharing of power with students in ways that go considerably beyond many current inauthentic and tokenistic attempts.

Our inclusion in the curriculum solves extinction

Darder 10 (Professor Antonia Darder, Distinguished Professor of Education, University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign, “Preface” in *Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, & Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement* by Richard V. Kahn, 2010, pp. xiv-xvi)

True to this dictum, Kahn unambiguously demands that the survival of the planet (and ourselves!) underscore our political and pedagogical decisions, despite the fact that seldom have questions of ecological concern been made central to the everyday lives of teachers and students or to the larger context of movement work, save for the liberal agenda of the Sierra Club or the well-meaning discourse on population control for poor and racialized women, espoused by people of all ideological stripes. Perhaps, it is this “missing link” in the curriculum of both public schools and political movements that is most responsible for the historically uncritical and listless response to the global suffering of human beings subjected to imperial regimes of genocide, slavery, and colonialism. In truth, a deeper analysis exposes sharply a legacy that persists today in the shrouded values and attitudes of educators from the dominant class and culture who expect that all oppressed populations and living species should acquiesce to the dominion and hegemonic rule of the wealthy elite. It is precisely such a worldview of domination that perpetuates the extinction of whole species, as it does the cultural and linguistic destruction of peoples and nations outside of a “first-world” classification. As a consequence, our biodiversity is slipping away, despite scientific findings that clearly warn of the loss of hardiness and vitality to human life, as a direct consequence of the homogenization of our differences. It is equally ironic to note here how repression of the body itself is manifested within the capitalist fervor to commodify or colonize all forms of vital existence. Schools, unfortunately, are one of the most complicit institutions in the exercise of such ecological repression, generally carried out through the immobilization of the body and the subordination of our emotional nature, our sexual energies, and spiritual capacities. In response, Kahn eloquently argues for a critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that supports teachers in engaging substatively students’ integral natures, in an effort to forge an emancipatory learning environment where all can thrive amid everyday concerns. As such, he makes clear that, although important, it is not enough to rely solnely on abstract cognitive processes, where only the analysis of words and texts are privileged in the construction of knowledge. Such an educational process of estrangement functions to alienate and isolate students from the natural world around them, from themselves, and one another. This, unwittingly, serves to reinforce an anthropocentric reading of the world, which denies and disregards the wisdom and knowledge outside Western formulations. In contrast, an ecopedagogy that sustains life and creativity is firmly grounded in a material and social understanding of our interconnected organic existence, as a starting place for classroom practice and political strategies for reinventing the world. Also significant to Kahn’s notion of ecopedagogy is an engagement with the emancipatory insights and cultural knowledge of indigenous populations, given that the majority of the social and political problems facing us today are fundamentally rooted in mainstream social relations and material conditions that fuel authoritarianism, fragmentation, alienation, violence, and greed. Such anti-ecological dynamics are predicated on an ahistorical and uncritical view of life that enables the powerful to abdicate their collective responsibility to democratic ideals, while superimposing a technocratic and instrumental rationality that commodifies and objectifies all existence. Such a practice of education serves to warp or marginalize diverse indigenous knowledge and practices, by privileging repetitive and unimaginative curricula and fetishized methods. Anchored upon such a perspective of schooling, classroom curriculum socializes students into full-blown identities as entitled consuming masters and exploiters of the earth, rather than collective caretakers of the planet. In contrast, Kahn explores the inherent possibilities at work within indigenous knowledge and traditions, in ways that enhance our capacity to not only critique conditions of ecological crisis, but to consider ways in which non-Western societies and peoples have enacted ecologically sustaining practices within the everyday lives of their communities. He turns the false dominion of the West on its head, offering alternative ways of being that hold possibilities for the reconstruction of institutional culture, the transformation of how we view technology and science, and thus the reformulation of public policy. As critical educators and revolutionary activists across communities of difference, we are encouraged to turn to the wisdom of our own historical survival, in serious and sustained ways, in order to work toward the abandonment of colonizing values and practices that for centuries have denigrated our cultural ways and attempted to disable our life-sustaining capacities.

# 2AC Predictibility/Limits

Predictability is a practice –

We don’t destroy predictability – we still you have to be related to the resolution – K of neolib is key to energy questions that’s byrne

No impact to fairness – disparaties are inevitable, it’s historically disproven, and self-correcting

Traditional debate isn’t neutral – an appeal to fairness is the neoliberal myth that obscures massive violence

Žižek and Daly 4 (Slavoj, Prof. of European Graduate School, Intl. Director of the Birkbeck Inst. for Humanities, U. of London, and Senior Researcher @ Inst. of Sociology, U. of Ljubljiana, and Glyn, Professor Intl. Studies @ Northampton U., “Risking the Impossible” http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm)

This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek's point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the fives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx's central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals; such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose "universalism" fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world's population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded "life-chances" cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the "developing world"). And Zizek's point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism's profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle.

Limits are impossible

De Cock 1 (Christian De Cock, Professor of Organizational behaviour, change management, creative problem solving, 2001, “Of Philip K. Dick, reflexivity and shifting realities Organizing (writing) in our post-industrial society” in the book “Science Fiction and Organization”)

'As Marx might have said more generally, 'all that is built or all that is "natural" melts into image' in the contemporary global economies of signs and space' (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 326). The opinion seems to be broadly shared among both academics and practitioners that traditional conceptions of effective organizing and decision-making are no longer viable because we live in a time of irredeemable turbulence and ambiguity (Gergen, 1995). The emerging digital or 'new' economy seems to be a technologically driven vision of new forms of organizing, relying heavily on notions of flexibility as a response this turbulence. Corporate dinosaurs must be replaced with smart networks that add value. Words such as 'cyberspace' 3 and 'cyborganization' drip easily from tongues (e.g. Parker and Cooper, 1998) and 'the organization' becomes more difficult to conceptualize as it 'dissipates into cyberspace' and 'permeates its own boundaries' (Hardy and Clegg 1997: S6). Organizations are losing important elements of permanence as two central features of the modern organization, namely the assumption of self-contained units and its structural solidity, are undermined (March, 1995). Even the concept of place becomes increasingly phantasmagoric as locales get thoroughly penetrated by social influences quite distant from them (Giddens, 1990). In this new organizational world 'reality' seems to have become only a contract, the fabrication of a consensus that can be modified or can break down at any time (Kallinikos, 1997) and the witnessing point - the natural datum or physical reference point - seems to be in danger of being scrapped (Brown, 1997). This notion that reality is dissolving from the inside cannot but be related with feelings of disorientation and anxiety. Casey (1995, pp. 70-1), for example, provides a vivid description of the position of 'the self' within these new organizational realities. This is a world where everyone has lost a sense of everyday competence and is dependent upon experts, where people become dependent on corporate bureaucracy and mass culture to know what to do. The solidity (or absence of it) of reality has of course been debated at great length in the fields of philosophy and social theory, but it remains an interesting fact that organizational scholars have become preoccupied with this issue in recent years. Hassard and Holliday (1998), for example, talk about the theoretical imperative to explore the linkages between fact/fiction and illusion/reality. It is as if some fundamental metaphysical questions have finally descended into the metaphorical organizational street. Over the past decade or so, many academics who label themselves critical management theorists and/or postmodernists (for once, let's not name any names) have taken issue with traditional modes of organizing (and ways of theorizing about this organizing) by highlighting many irrationalities and hidden power issues. These academics have taken on board the idea that language has a role in the constitution of reality and their work is marked by a questioning of the nature of reality, of our conception of knowledge, cognition, perception and observation (e.g. Chia, 1996a; Cooper and Law, 1995; Czarniawska, 1997). Notwithstanding the importance of their contributions, these authors face the problem that in order to condemn a mode of organizing or theorizing they need to occupy an elevated position, a sort of God's eye view of the world; a position which they persuasively challenge when they deconstruct the claims of orthodox/modern organizational analyses (Parker, 2000; Weiskopf and Willmott, 1997). Chia, for example, writes about the radically untidy, ill-adjusted character of the fields of actual experience - 'It is only by … giving ourselves over to the powers of "chaos", ambiguity, and confusion that new and deeper insights and understanding can be attained' (Chia, 1996b, p. 423) - using arguments which could not be more tidy, analytical and precise. This of course raises the issue of reflexivity: if reality can never be stabilized and the research/theorizing process 'is always necessarily precarious, incomplete and fragmented' (Chia, 1996a, p. 54), then Chia's writing clearly sits rather uncomfortably with his ontological and epistemological beliefs. In this he is, of course, not alone (see, e.g., Gephart et al.., 1996; Cooper and Law, 1995). This schizophrenia is evidence of rather peculiar discursive rules where certain ontological and epistemological statements are allowed and even encouraged, but the reciprocate communicational practices are disallowed. Even the people who are most adventurous in their ideas or statements (such as Chia) are still caught within rather confined communicational practices. To use Vickers' (1995) terminology: there is a disjunction between the ways in which organization theorists are ready to see and value the organizational world (their appreciative setting) and the ways in which they are ready to respond to it (their instrumental system). When we write about reflexivity, paradox and postmodernism in organizational analysis, it is expected that we do this unambiguously. 4 And yet, the notion that 'if not consistency, then chaos' is not admitted even by all logicians, and is rejected by many at the frontiers of natural science research - 'a contradiction causes only some hell to break loose' (McCloskey, 1994, p. 166). contradiction causes only some hell to break loose' (McCloskey, 1994, p. 166).

Fairness is the myth of the neutral economy that creates structural inequality

Egnor 11 (Bill Egnor, contributor and assistant to the publisher at Firedoglake, Nov 28, 2011, “Occupy Wall St: It is All About Fairness, and that is the Strength of It”, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/11/28/1040453/-Occupy-Wall-St:-It-is-All-About-Fairness,-and-that-is-the-Strength-of-It)

America has a lot of national myths. In this we are not so different from any nation in the history of nations. Still the myths are not always true, but they are what we think should be true, what we want to be true, about out nation. One of these is the idea of a level playing field. I know and you know that it very rarely is truly level. The existence of clichés like “It is not what you know but who you know” shows that there has always been groups of people subverting the level field, but it is still something we grow up internalizing, that all things should generally be fair and if they are then the best rise or the hardest working or even the luckiest will rise to the top. It is such a basic concept that elected Republicans have been using it for years to argue for tax breaks for the ultra-wealthy. They say it is not fair that they pay so much more in absolute dollars (even though they are paying far, far less in taxes as a percent of their total income) than other people. Or that we have to abolish the estate tax because it is unfair to family farmers or small businesses. But there is a realization that has been pushed by the Occupy Movement, namely that when it is basically 300 million on one side and 4 million or so on the other most of the 300 million are going to agree on the problem. The 99% really do have more in common on this issue than the 1%. If my cousin can see these realities, feel the inequity and want to do some of the same things that I do, then there is a dawning realization in this nation that the promise of even a fig leaf of fairness has been betrayed and needs to be fixed. This is the meme that I think we need to embrace. The premise of this nation is that we are all equal, but we have managed to get ourselves into a situation where some are more equal than others due to their wealth. While I think most people are okay with the idea that there are always going to be some really wealthy people, they are not okay with the idea of people being so wealthy that they can control the rest of us with their **money** and move government to benefit them solely at the expense of the rest of us. There is a split forming between the elected Republicans and the Republicans who make up the bulk of the party. Poll after poll shows that the nation as a whole and even the a majority of the self-identified Republicans want things that the elected officials of the GOP do not want. From taxing the rich to collective bargaining to health care reform to unemployment extensions to spending on infrastructure and jobs, the nation is firmly behind ideas that the Republicans will not even allow to come up for debate or a vote. It seems to me that this offers us an opportunity to make some common cause with some conservatives. I don’t think that David and I will ever agree on a range of social issues, but do we have to when there is a problem that confronts us both and we agree on some solutions? When I grew up around politics in the late 1970’s and all of the 1980’s one of the things that Mom was always on about was the need to work together with Republicans where there is common ground. Sometimes you would have to really fight on issues, but most of the time there was a clear understanding that there was a problem and it needs some addressing, and that got done more often than not. We have a rash of elected Republicans who are listening to the voices of the 1% who can and do donate to and coordinate (not always staying on the right side of the law) with them instead of the voice of their own party. Sure the faux grassroots Tea Party has a large voice and is supposedly the base of the GOP, but they are, mostly, just another Astroturf group propped up by Koch brother’s money. There are always going to be myriad little areas of unfairness. It has been that way for the whole of human history, but that does not prevent us from striving to make things more fair over all. The information that is coming out from the OWS movement and its repetition has made it clear that there is a major lack of fairness in economic terms. It is hard to know if we would have addressed this if it had not become so stark, and there were not so many people out of work or underemployed. However now that we are talking about it, the time has come to stand up for fairness. If we take this essential meme and really push it, focus on the fact that most of us, Republican and Democrat, Liberal and Conservative, Hippy and Square alike are mostly being treated unfair, then there is a chance to actually move the nation in the direction we need to go. Every kid will tell you that what is fair is right, even if it is not always advantageous to oneself. That is not a flaw of callow youth, but a virtue that we should be looking for in our politics and our politicians. We are the 99% and as such, if we work together, we can change things.

Their move is not benign – the rhetoric of limits creates a necessarily exclusionary and authoritarian politics

Kulynych 97 (Kulynych, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, 1997 [Jessica, “Performing Politics," Polity, Winter, v.XXX, n.2, p. 315-330)

II. Disciplining Habermas Political scientists have traditionally understood political participation as an activity that assures individual influence over the political system, protection of private interests, system legitimacy, and perhaps even selfdevelopment. Habermas and Foucault describe the impact of the conditions of postmodernity on the possibility for efficacious political action in remarkably similar ways. Habermas describes a world where the possibilities for efficacious political action are quite limited. The escalating interdependence of state and economy, the expansive increase in bureaucratization, the increasingly technical nature of political decisionmaking, and the subsequent colonization of a formerly sacred private sphere by a ubiquitous administrative state render traditional modes of political participation unable to provide influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development.' As the state is forced to take an ever larger role in directing a complex global, capitalist, welfare state economy, the scope of administration inevitably grows. In order to fulfill its function as the manager of the economy, the administrative state must also manage the details of our lives formerly considered private. Yet, as the state's role in our "private" lives continues to grow, the public has become less and less interested in government, focusing instead on personal and social mores, leisure, and consumption. Ironically, we have become less interested in politics at precisely the same moment when our lives are becoming increasingly "politicized" and administered. This siege of private life and the complicity of this ideology of "civil privatism" in the functioning of the modern administrative state makes a mockery of the idea that there exist private interests that can be protected from state intervention.4 Correlatively, the technical and instrumental rationality of modem policymaking significantly lessens the possibility for public influence on state policy.5 The difficulty of participation in Habermas's world is exacerbated by the added complexity of a political system structured by hierarchical gender and racial norms. Nancy Fraser uses Habermas's analysis of the contemporary situation to demonstrate how the infusion of these hierarchical gender and racial norms into the functioning of the state and economy ensures that political channels of communication between citizens and the state are unequally structured and therefore cannot function as mechanisms for the equal protection of interests.' Accordingly, theorists are much less optimistic about the possibilities for citizens to acquire or develop feelings of autonomy and efficacy from the attempt to communicate interests to a system that is essentially impervious to citizen interests, eschews discussion of long-term goals, and requires exclusively technical and instrumental debate. Similarly, Foucault's complex genealogical descriptions of disciplinary power networks challenge the traditional assumption that political power is located primarily in the formal apparatus of the state. The traditional understanding of political participation tells us nothing about what types of political action are appropriate in a world where power is typically and predominantly disciplinary, productive, and normalizing. As long as we define the purpose of participation only in terms of influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development, we will be unable to see how political action can be effective in the contemporary world. While separately both Habermas and Foucault challenge the traditional understanding of participation, their combined insights further and irrevocably extend that challenge. Theoretical focus on the distinctions between Habermas and Foucault has all too often obscured important parallels between these two theorists. Specifically, the HabermasFoucault debate has underemphasized the extent to which Habermas also describes a disciplinary society. In his descriptions of bureaucracy, technocracy, and system colonization, Habermas is also describing a world where power is productive and dispersed and where political action is constrained and normalized. Habermas, like Foucault, describes a type of power that cannot be adequately characterized in terms of the intentions of those who possess it. Colonization is not the result of conscious intention, but is rather the unintended consequence of a multitude of small adjustments. The gender and racial subtexts infusing the system are not the results of conscious intention, but rather of implicit gender and racial norms and expectations infecting the economy and the state. Bureaucratic power is not a power that is possessed by any individual or agency, but exists in the exercise of decisionmaking. As Iris Young points out, we must "analyze the exercise of power [in contemporary societies] as the effect of often liberal and humane practices of education, bureaucratic administration, production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine and so on."' The very practices that Habermas chronicles are exemplary of a power that has no definitive subject. As Young explains, "the conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are simply doing their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression."" Colonization and bureaucratization also fit the pattern of a power that is not primarily repressive but productive. Disciplinary technologies are, as Sawicki describes, not ... repressive mechanisms ... [that] operate primarily through violence ... or seizure ... but rather [they operate] by producing new objects and subjects of knowledge, by inciting and channeling desires, generating and focusing individual and group energies, and establishing bodily norms and techniques for observing, monitoring and controlling bodily movements, processes, and capacities. The very practices of administration, distribution, and decisionmaking on which Habermas focuses his attention can and must be analyzed as productive disciplinary practices. Although these practices can clearly be repressive, their most insidious effects are productive. Rather than simply holding people back, bureaucratization breaks up, categorizes, and systemizes projects and people. It creates new categories of knowledge and expertise. Bureaucratization and colonization also create new subjects as the objects of bureaucratic expertise. The social welfare client and the consumer citizen are the creation of bureaucratic power, not merely its target. The extension of lifeworld gender norms into the system creates the possibility for sexual harassment, job segregation, parental leave, and consensual corporate decisionmaking. Created as a part of these subjectivities are new gestures and norms of bodily behavior, such as the embarrassed shuffling of food stamps at the grocery checkout and the demeaning sexual reference at the office copier. Bodily movements are monitored and regularized by means of political opinion polls, welfare lists, sexual harassment protocols, flex-time work schedules, and so forth. Modern disciplinary power, as described by Foucault and implied by Habermas, does not merely prevent us from developing, but creates us differently as the effect of its functioning. These disciplinary techniques not only control us, but also enable us to be more efficient and more productive, and often more powerful. Focusing on the disciplinary elements of the Habermasian critique opens the door for exploring the postmodern character of Habermasian politics. Because Habermas does describe a disciplinary world, his prescription for contemporary democracy (discursive politics) ought to be sensitive to, and appropriate for, a disciplinary world. Foucault's sensitivity to the workings of disciplinary power is central to the articulation of a plausible, postmodern version of discursive politics. In the following discussion I will argue for a performative redefinition of participation that will reinvigorate the micro-politics demanded by Foucault, as well as provide a more nuanced version of the discursive politics demanded by Habermas. III. Habermas and Discursive Participation Habermas regards a public sphere of rational debate as the only possible foundation for democratic politics in the contemporary world. For Habermas, like Schumpeter, democracy is a method. Democracies are systems that achieve the formation of public opinion and public will through a correct process of public communication, and then "translate" that communicative power into administrative power via the procedurally regulated public spheres of parliaments and the judiciary. The extent to which this translation occurs is the measure of a healthy constitutional democracy. Thus, the "political public sphere" is the "fundamental concept of a theory of democracy." In this discursive definition of democracy, political participation takes on a new character. Participation equals discursive participation; it is communication governed by rational, communicatively achieved argument and negotiation. Habermas distinguishes two types of discursive participation: problem-solving or decision-oriented deliberation, which takes place primarily in formal democratic institutions such as parliaments and is regulated or governed by democratic procedures; and informal opinion-formation, which is opinion-formation "uncoupled from decisions ... [and] effected in an open and inclusive network of overlapping, subcultural publics having fluid temporal, social and substantive boundaries."" In many ways this two-tiered description of discursive participation is a radically different understanding of political participation, and one better suited to the sort of societies we currently inhabit. Habermas moves the focus of participation away from policymaking and toward redefining legitimate democratic processes that serve as the necessary background for subsequent policymaking. While only a limited number of specially trained individuals can reasonably engage in decisionmaking participation, the entire populous can and must participate in the informal deliberation that takes place outside of, or uncoupled from, formal decisionmaking structures. This informal participation is primarily about generating "public discourses that uncover topics of relevance to all of society, interpret values, contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good reasons, and debunk bad ones."" Informal participation has two main functions. First, it acts as a "warning system with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society."" This system communicates problems "that must be processed by the political system."" Habermas labels this the "signal" function. Second, informal participation must not only indicate when problems need to be addressed, it must also provide an "effective problematization" of those issues; As Habermas argues, from the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes." Informal participation is crucial because it is the source of both legitimacy and innovation in formal decisionmaking. As long as decisionmaking is open to the influence of informal opinion-formation, then state policies are legitimate because they are grounded in free and equal communication that meets the democratic requirement of equal participation. Informal participation originating in the public sphere is also the resource for innovative descriptions and presentations of interests, preferences, and issues. If they ignore informal participation, state decisionmakers have no connection to the center of democracy: the political public sphere. Habermas's description of discursive participation is also novel and effective due to its broad construal of the participatory act. Participation is defined very broadly because the concept of the public sphere remains quite abstract. The public sphere is a "linguistically constituted public space." 16 It is neither an institution nor an organization. Rather, it is a "network for communicating information and points of view [which are] ... filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions." ''' Public spheres are defined not by a physical presence but rather by a "communication structure." According to Habermas, "the more they detach themselves from the public's physical presence and extend to the virtual presence of scattered readers, listeners, or viewers linked by public media, the clearer becomes the abstraction that enters when the spatial structure of simple interactions is expanded into a public sphere." 'I In other words, actually being present in a "concrete locale" is unnecessary for the existence of a public sphere, and hence unnecessary for active participation. Participation is not limited to large, organized discussions in formal settings; it also includes "simple and episodic encounters" in which actors "reciprocally [attribute] communicative freedom to each other."19 This abstraction makes participation easier and extremely inclusive. As Habermas describes, "every encounter in which actors do not just observe each other but take a second-person attitude, reciprocally attributing communicative freedom to each other, unfolds in a linguistically constituted public space." 20 Thus, the concerns that political scientists have had about unequal resource distribution and its effect on one's capability to act are mitigated in Habermas's broad definition of discursive participation. Even though limited resources may prevent active interventions in decisionmaking and policymaking processes, for Habermas the "communicative structures of the public sphere relieve the public of the burden of decision-making."" In a similar vein, Habermas does not limit participation to a specific set of activities, but defines it procedurally or contextually. Participation is not limited to traditional activities such as voting, campaigning, or letter-writing, but is instead designated by the discursive quality of the activity. In other words, it is not the intent to influence policy that defines participation, but rather the communication structure in which the activity takes place. That communication structure must be equitable and inclusive, social problems must be openly and rationally deliberated, and they must be thematized by people potentially affected. However, Habermas's discursive formulation is inadequate primarily because it does not explicitly and rigorously attend to the disciplinary effects of contemporary societies explained so creatively by Foucault. Habermas has been routinely criticized for ignoring the productive nature of contemporary power. His juxtaposition of system and lifeworld in The Theory of Communicative Action relies on a separation of good power from bad (communicative power v. steering media), and posits an ideal speech situation freed from the distortions of power." More importantly, Habermas's theorization of discursive participation is exceedingly abstract and does not adequately attend to the ways in which power informs discourse. A number of theorists have effectively argued that women and men do not stand in equal relationship to language. For example, Linda Zerilli argues that discursive space is a "fraternal community of unique and symbolic dimensions."23 Women utilize language in this discursive world "whose `common' and symbolic language ... enables one user to understand what another is saying; just as it compels each speaker to constrain [themselves] within the limits of an existing political vocabulary."24 In this case the content of speech is systematically limited in direct violation of the required conditions for the ideal speech situation. The foundations of communication are not the ideal equal relationships that Habermas imagines, but are instead an exclusive, learned, and gendered, symbolic heritage. As Carole Pateman points out, women enter into public discussion on a very tenuous plane. The symbolic heritage that defines the meaning of key communicative concepts such as consent systematically excludes women from the category of individuals capable of consenting. 11 The mere existence of a debate over whether "no means no" with regard to consensual sexual relations and rape is a manifestation of this heritage. Women can hardly be seen as equal participants when they do not have the same opportunity to express their intent. Certainly, one might suggest that the above cases are really just failures of speech, and, therefore, not a critique of ideal speech as it is formulated by Habermas. Indeed Seyla Benhabib reformulates Habermas's speech act perspective to make it sensitive to the above critique. She argues that feminists concerned with the discourse model of democracy have often confused the historically biased practices of deliberative assemblies with the normative ideal of rational deliberation." She suggests that feminists concerned with inequities and imbalances in communication can actually benefit from the Habermasian requirement that all positions and issues be made " `public' in the sense of making [them] accessible to debate, reflection, action and moral-political transformation."" The "radical proceduralism of the discourse model makes it ideally suited to identify inequities in communication because it precludes our accepting unexamined and unjustified positions." Even such a sophisticated and sensitive approach to ideal speech as Benhabib's cannot cleanse communicative action of its exclusivity. It is not only that acquiring language is a process of mastering a symbolic heritage that is systematically gendered, but the entire attempt to set conditions for "ideal speech" is inevitably exclusive. The model of an ideal speech situation establishes a norm of rational interaction that is defined by the very types of interaction it excludes. The norm of rational debate favors critical argument and reasoned debate over other forms of communication.29 Defining ideal speech inevitably entails defining unacceptable speech. What has been defined as unacceptable in Habermas's formulation is any speech that is not intended to convey an idea. Speech evocative of identity, culture, or emotion has no necessary place in the ideal speech situation, and hence persons whose speech is richly colored with rhetoric, gesture, humor, spirit, or affectation could be defined as deviant or immature communicators. Therefore, a definition of citizenship based on participation in an ideal form of interaction can easily become a tool for the exclusion of deviant communicators from the category of citizens. This sort of normalization creates citizens as subjects of rational debate. Correlatively, as Fraser explains, because the communicative action approach is procedural it is particularly unsuited to address issues of speech content." Therefore, by definition, it misses the relationship between procedure and content that is at the core of feminist and deconstructive critiques of language. A procedural approach can require that we accommodate all utterances and that we not marginalize speaking subjects. It cannot require that we take seriously or be convinced by the statements of such interlocutors. In other words, a procedural approach does not address the cultural context that makes some statements convincing and others not. I would suggest that Habermas recognizes this problem, but has yet to explicitly theorize it. As I noted above, Habermas requires that informal discursive participation not only identify problems but also "convincingly and influentially thematize them." A thematization is legitimate, Habermas argues, only when it stems from a communicative process that "develops out of communication taking place among those who are potentially affected."" Thus, the extent to which a position is convincing seems to rely primarily on whether the affected parties have had a say in its articulation (a procedural requirement). What Habermas does not explicitly recognize is that whether a problem is convincingly thematized is not just a matter of utilizing correct procedure.

# 2AC Ground

Begs the question of politics – if we win ecopedagogy is good then you *should* have predicted it

They can say, renewable energy bad, critical pedagogy bad, neolib good, and any number of kritiks – radical ecology faces a massive amount of criticism in the squo, and people generally seem to like things like the market – it’s not like we didn’t give you ground

Ground loss inevitable – there’s a competitive advantage to race to the margins, policy debate incentivizes obscure disads

# 2AC Switch Side Debate

We meet – we don’t mandate personal agreement, we just say ecopedagogy is a better method

Link turn – ecopedagogy key to contestation and democratic dissent – that’s Kahn

Switch-side debate assumes a false subtraction from politics – Giroux says that disables activism

Their call for switch-side debate for decision-making skills mirrors the technique of the far-right – it occludes mass extinction of life

Kahn 10 (Richard Kahn, Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Research at the University of North Dakota, *Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, & Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement*, 2010, pp. 9-11)

Worse still, though, is that here environmental literacy has not only been co-opted by corporate state forces and morphed into a progressively-styled, touchy-feely method for achieving higher scores on standardized tests like the ACT and SAT, but in an Orwellian turn it has come to stand in actuality for a real illiteracy about the nature of ecological catastrophe, its causes, and possible solutions. As I will argue in this book, our current course for social and environmental disaster (though highly complex and not easily boiled down to a few simple causes or strategies for action) must be traced to the evolution of: an anthropocentric worldview grounded in what the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (1993) refers to as a matrix of domination (see chapter 1); a global technocapitalist infrastructure that relies upon market-based and functionalist versions of technoliteracy to instantiate and augment its socioeconomic and cultural control (see chapters 2 and 3); an unsustainable, reductionistic, and antidemocratic model of institutional science (see chapter 4); and the wrongful marginalization and repression of pro-ecological resistance through the claim that it represents a “terrorist” force that is counter to the morals of a democratic society rooted in tolerance, educational change, and civic debate (see chapter 5). By contrast, the environmental literacy standards now showcased at places like the Zoo School as “Hallmarks of Quality” (Archie, 2003, p. 11) are those that consciously fail to develop the type of radical and partisan subjectivity in students, that might be capable of deconstructing their socially and environmentally deleterious hyper-individualism or their obviously socialized identities that tend toward state-sanctioned norms of competition, hedonism, consumption, marketization, and forms of quasi-fascistic patriotism. Just as Stapp (1969) theorized environmental literacy as a form of political moderation that could pacify the types of civic upheaval, that occurred during the Civil Rights era, now too during the tendentious political atmosphere that has arisen as the legacy of the George W. Bush presidency, being environmentally literate quite suspiciously means learning how to turn the other cheek and listen to “both sides” of an issue—even when the issue is the unprecedented mass extinction of life taking place on the planet. In a manner that accords more with Fox News than Greenpeace, a leading environmental literacy pamphlet (Archie, 2003) emphasizes that “Teaching and learning about the environment can bring up controversies that must be handled in a fair and balanced manner in the classroom” (p. 11). Later in the document a teacher from Lincoln High School in Wisconsin is highlighted in order to provide expert advice in a similar fashion: “I’d say the most important aspect of teaching about the environment is to look at all aspects involved with an issue or problem. Teach from an unbiased position no matter how strong your ideas are about the topic. Let the kids make decisions for themselves” (p. 12), she implores. This opinion is mirrored by the Environmental Education Division of the Environmental Protection Agency (a federal office, created by the Bush administration, dedicated to furthering environmental literacy), which on its own website underscores as “Basic Information” that “Environmental education does not advocate a particular viewpoint or course of action. Rather, it is claimed that environmental education teaches individuals how to weigh various sides of an issue through critical thinking and it enhances their own problem-solving and decision-making skills.”10 Yet, this definition was authored by an administration trumping for a wider right-wing movement that attempts to use ideas of “fair and balanced” and “critical thinking” to occlude obvious social and ecological injustices, as well as the advantage it gains in either causing or sustaining them. This same logic defending the universal value of nonpartisan debate has been used for well over a decade by the right to prevent significant action on global warming. Despite overwhelming scientific acceptance of its existence and threat, as well as of its primarily anthropogenic cause, those on the right have routinely trotted out their own pseudo-science on global warming and thereby demanded that more research is necessary to help settle a debate on the issue that only they are interested in continuing to facilitate. Likewise, within academic circles themselves, powerful conservatives like David Horowitz have the support of many in government who are seeking to target progressive scholars and viewpoints on university and college campuses as biased evidence of a leftist conspiracy at work in higher education (Nocella, Best & McLaren, Forthcoming). In order to combat such alleged bias, “academic freedom” is asserted as a goal in which “both sides” of academic issues must be represented in classrooms, departments, and educational events. The result of this form of repressive tolerance (see chapter 5) is simply to impede action on matters worth acting on and to gain further ideological space for right-wing, corporate and other conservative-value agendas.11 It is clear, then, that despite the effects and growth of environmental education over the last few decades, it is a field that is ripe for a radical reconstruction of its literacy agenda. Again, while something like environmental education (conceived broadly) should be commended for the role it has played in helping to articulate many of the dangers and pitfalls that modern life now affords, it is also clear that it has thus far inadequately surmised the larger structural challenges now at hand and has thus tended to intervene in a manner far too facile to demand or necessitate a rupture of the status quo. What has thereby resulted is a sort of crisis of environmental education generally and, as a result, the prevailing trends in the field have recently been widely critiqued by a number of theorists and educators who have sought to highlight their limitations.

# 2AC Lundberg

Lundberg just says debate

Lundberg impact is backwards – we have to foreground a critique of social conditions that deliberation is constructed on to activate political agency

Edwards 13 (Jason Edwards, Lecturer in Politics, Programme Director BA Politics and Government at Birbeck University of London, 2013, “Play and Democracy: Huizinga and the Limits of Agonism,” *Political Theory* 41(1) 90–115, DOI: 10.1177/0090591712463200)

The idea that democracy is played as a form of life implies that what is expressed through the agon is the normative grounds of democratic life. It is in this sense that playing the democratic game requires the acceptance of a shared ethos or attitude that has no ultimate rationale or justification. An agonistic polity must be constituted by more than the formal representation of the political unity of citizens through the constitution, the emblems of political identity such as the flag, the national anthem, etc. Its unity is given through its modes of contestation, but in turn these are the inherited forms of life peculiar to a given political community. The persistence of that community over time is reliant upon a certain degree of stability and predictability of those forms. Thus the problem of the distinction between the form and substance of play that appears in the work of both Huizinga and contemporary agonists draws our attention towards the fact that in general games of democratic political contestation are no more or no less autonomous than other kinds of games. The playing of the democratic game is dependent on more than its formal or abstract rules, and relies on particular social and material conditions for its performance. Hence a third problem posed by the concept of play to contemporary agonism is how it can account for and address the social relations and material conditions that constitute the agon. Indeed, can it provide such an account if the tendency to overemphasize the autonomy of language and culture leads to a failure to recognize the centrality of the wider economy of agonism in the constitution of agonistic democratic contest? This is not an insurmountable problem if what we have here is a simple matter of overemphasis, for it would seem regressive and crude to dismiss the idea that democratic language and culture have their own specific effects on the character of democratic political action. Yet those with a critical perspective on the agonistic turn in political theory have provided reasons for thinking that the neglect of matters of the social and material constitution of agonistic relations rests on a misunderstanding of the very nature of political agency. On this view, as Lois McNay claims, political agency is construed in certain strains of agonistic thought in abstract and discursive terms, rather than as a “capacity of embodied subjects,” and there is a failure to recognise “the social conditions necessary for the emergence of effective political agency.” 15 In this sense, and as a reading of Huizinga’s works helps to establish, the context and materials of play cannot be divorced from play itself: to do so would be to idealize the form of play and to draw our attention away from the social relations and material practices that give shape to the conduct of the contesting actors in democratic games. Huizinga and contemporary agonists share in common a dismissal of a crude socioeconomic reductionism characteristic of particular kinds of Marxist thought. However, as I will argue, in their work the pendulum swings too far the other way and we lose sight of the necessary embeddedness of play—and culture—in social relations and material practices.

They idealize debate – contestation does not automatically lead to democratic politics – social relations first

Edwards 13 (Jason Edwards, Lecturer in Politics, Programme Director BA Politics and Government at Birbeck University of London, 2013, “Play and Democracy: Huizinga and the Limits of Agonism,” *Political Theory* 41(1) 90–115, DOI: 10.1177/0090591712463200)

What a reading of Huizinga brings to light is the significance of the concept of play, not just in his own work but in current considerations of agonism. In many respects, we can see agonistic contest as playful in character. Yet Huizinga’s application of the concept of play to the agon leads to a confusion that is repeated in contemporary agonism. Huizinga wishes to provide a general account of the play-form independently of its specific historical and social manifestations, and in so doing to draw a distinction between playful and serious activity. As I have been concerned to show, such a distinction, as is apparent in Huizinga’s own considerations of particular forms of play, cannot be maintained outside of a formal scheme. What constitutes play and the character and role of playful activity is given not by a set of formal characteristics but what I have referred to as the economy of agonism, that is, the economic, social, and political relations and space through and in which play takes place. In maintaining that there is a formal distinction to be drawn between antagonism and agonism, in assuming that it is the agon itself as a play-form that is expressed through agonistic contest, and in relegating the importance of the materials of play in shaping and limiting the space of the agon, contemporary agonistic theorists repeat Huizinga’s mistake of privileging the autonomy and priority of play, conceived of as the very form of culture, in the constitution of democratic politics. What political theory today requires is a return to the substance of Huizinga’s analysis of play, which while emphasizing the significance of play as an aesthetic activity, equally points us towards its involvement in and dependence on the wider economy of agonism. The aesthetic turn in political theory has brought to light the importance of the playful character of political performance, and acted as a significant corrective to crude forms of socioeconomic determinism and the idealizing abstractions of liberal theories of justice and discourse ethics. However, there has been a tendency in the course of this turn to idealize democratic politics and to conceive of democratic subjects as agents of contestation by virtue of their playful form. We need to bring the contesting democratic subject into question by recognising the historical constitution of such forms of political agency, and the social and material conditions that give rise to democratic identities. In this way we will have a clearer view of the relationship between forms of power and forms of democratic politics, and a more critical understanding of the purpose and value of democratic contestation.

# 2AC Hager

Hager = anticap anti-expert

Hager ‘7 (Carol, Assoc. Prof. of Political Science @ Bryn Mawr College, “Three Decades of Protest in Berlin Land-Use Planning, 1975-2005” German Studies Review 30, no. 1)

The West German postwar political consensus was shaken in the 1970s by a wave of citizen protest. The protest was often directed at **large, state-sponsored industrial projects such as nuclear and coal-fired power plants**. Citizens objected not only to the environmental degradation caused by these projects, but also to **a system of planning** that excluded local residents from decisions that would affect the character of their communities. In this sense the protest was about democratic legitimacy. Focusing on the city of Berlin, I argue that the protests of the 1970s and 1980s resulted in both a more activist citizenry and a more participatory planning process. I then examine how participation in land-use planning has evolved in Berlin since German unification. I find that, while the desire to mitigate conflict has led planners to incorporate local citizen input, institutional and attitudinal barriers to inclusive, effective planning **remain** which keep the legitimation issue alive. Grassroots protest is still an oft-used and necessary tool to draw attention to the local effects of development decisions and to democratic deficits in the planning process. This article draws connections between the social movement and urban planning literatures, which have remained largely separate. Cases of local conflict in land-use planning can speak to important questions about the nature of citizen participation in industrialized democracies. A look at citizen protest around planning issues over a thirty year span in Berlin reveals the following: 1. Protesters intentionally politicized areas of policy making that had formerly been accepted as the **purview of technical experts**. The Berlin case shows how the protests of the 1970s linked the goals of grassroots democracy and community quality of life in a way that has had lasting impact on the land-use planning process. The protesters asserted that only a democratic decision making process could produce legitimate and competent policy. This is a significant change from the technocratic mentality of the past, and it sits uneasily with the government goal of increasing bureaucratic efficiency.

The Hager evidence is descriptive, assumes mobilization is already occurring. Aff can’t explain the extrinsic motivation: Our critique is key

Hager ’95 (Carol J., Assoc. Prof. of Political Science @ Bryn Mawr, “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” Polity, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 65-66)

Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against **the administrative-economic system in general.** One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simultaneously as resistance against the **entire atomic program**. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture.... Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protection of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of project plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggravate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at **Systemkritik**.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitimation dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimension emerged as the more important and in many ways **the more problematic.**

Calling debate’s limits into question is key to deliberative democracy

Hager ’95 (Carol J., Assoc. Prof. of Political Science @ Bryn Mawr, “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” Polity, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 69-70)

It is, however, the **act of calling existing boundaries into question** that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a “symbolic” challenge by proposing “a different **way of perceiving and naming the world**.”58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of security issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt “green” issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitimation concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a deliberative politics in modern technological society.61

It’s *less* difficult, to learn the technical skills – the ideological critique is key

Hager ’95 (Carol J., Assoc. Prof. of Political Science @ Bryn Mawr, “Technical Debate in Administrative Court” *Technological Democracy: Bureaucracy and Citizenry in the German Energy Debate*, p. 209)

The case study reveals the energy problem to be less technical and more political than the above question indicates. The BI had **remarkably little difficulty** grasping the technical aspects of energy planning. The **difficulty lay** in exposing the political interests behind the government's technical language and form and in forcing an open political discussion. From the BI point of view, the question became how members of the local community could assert their will against a state-economy complex that followed a different rationality from theirs and thus acted in a manner destructive to the community. They faced a situation in which the **form and content** of policies worked against the goals and the self-understanding of a significant portion of the citizenry.

# 2AC Education/Policymaking

Link turn – politics is dead, that’s above – ecopedagogy is the only way to politicize debate and mobilize us as intellectuals and activists

Fetishizing instrumental education kills resistance to neoliberal ideology

Giroux 11 (Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 28 February 2011, “Left Behind? American Youth and the Global Fight for Democracy”, http://www.truth-out.org/left-behind-american-youth-and-global-fight-democracy68042)

Meanwhile, not only have academic jobs been disappearing, but given the shift to an instrumentalist education that is technicist in nature, students have been confronted for quite some time with a vanishing culture for sustained critical thinking. As universities and colleges emphasize market-based skills, students are neither learning how to think critically nor how to connect private troubles with larger public issues. The humanities continue to be downsized, eliminating one source of learning that encourages students to develop a commitment to public values, social responsibilities and the broader demands of critical citizenship. Moreover, critical thinking has been devalued as a result of the growing corporatization of higher education. Under the influence of corporate values, thought in its most operative sense loses its modus operandi as a critical mediation on "civilization, existence and forms of evaluation."(34) Increasingly, it has become more difficult for students to recognize how their education in the broadest sense has been systematically devalued and how this not only undercuts their ability to be engaged critics, but contributes further to making American democracy dysfunctional. How else to explain the reticence of students in protesting against tuition hikes? The forms of instrumental training they receive undermine any critical capacity to connect the fees they pay to the fact that the United States puts more money into the funding of war, armed forces and military weaponry than the next 25 countries combined - money that could otherwise fund higher education.(35) The inability both to be critical of such injustices and to relate them to a broader understanding of politics, suggests a failure to think outside of the normative sensibilities of a neoliberal ideology that isolates knowledge and normalizes its own power relations. In fact, one recent study found that "45 percent of students show no significant improvement in the key measures of critical thinking, complex reasoning and writing by the end of their sophomore years."(36) The corporatization of schooling over the last few decades has done more than make universities into adjuncts of corporate power. It has also produced a culture of illiteracy and undermined the conditions necessary to enable students to be engaged and critical agents. The value of knowledge is now linked to a crude instrumentalism and the only mode of education that seems to matter is one that enthusiastically endorses learning marketable skills, embracing a survival-of-the-fittest ethic and defining the good life solely through accumulation and disposing of the latest consumer goods. Academic knowledge has been stripped of its value as a social good; to be relevant and therefore funded, knowledge has to justify itself in market terms or simply perish.

They spatialize the political – imagining the debate space as abstracted from the political destroys the potential for change and confines us to ivory tower politics – that’s Giroux

Focusing on the levers of power cedes politics to warmongers

Kappeler, Freelance author and teacher in England and Germany, 1995 [Susanne, *The Will to Violence: the Politics of Personal Behavior*, p. 9-11]

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in. a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the `outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, `what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen.' 'We are the war' - and we also `are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called `peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or,- as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are, indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political- disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war' and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. So if we move beyond the usual frame of violence, towards the structures of thought employed in decisions to act, this also means making an analysis of action. This seems all the more urgent as action seems barely to be perceived any longer. There is talk of the government doing `nothing', of its `inaction', of the need for action, the time for action, the need for strategies, our inability to act as well as our desire to become `active' again. We seem to deem ourselves in a kind of action vacuum which, like the cosmic black hole, tends to consume any renewed effort only to increase its size. Hence this is also an attempt to shift the focus again to the fact that. we are continually acting and doing, and that there is no such thing as not acting or doing nothing.

**Traditional conceptions of government fiat are fiction—they misrepresent the process of government decisionmaking, and are neither educational nor predictable**

Claude 1988 (Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, pages 18-20)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of *policy* and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the *Genesis* theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

This is especially true in policy debate

Mitchell, Ass’t. Prof. of Communications at Pittsburgh, 1998 [Gordon, "Pedagogical Possibilities for Argumentative Agency in Academic Debate," Argumentation and Advocacy, Fall, ProQuest]

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherence of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most politically debilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life" (1991, p. 8).

[He Continues...]

The sense of argumentative agency produced through action research is different in kind from those skills that are honed through academic simulation exercises such as policy debate tournaments. Encounters with broader public spheres beyond the realm of the academy can deliver unique pedagogical possibilities and opportunities. By anchoring their work in public spaces, students and teachers can use their talents to change the trajectory of events, while events are still unfolding. These experiences have the potential to trigger significant shifts in political awareness on the part of participants. Academic debaters nourished on an exclusive diet of competitive contest round experience often come to see politics like a picturesque landscape whirring by through the window of a speeding train. They study this political landscape in great detail, rarely (if ever) entertaining the idea of stopping the train and exiting to alter the course of unfolding events. The resulting spectator mentality deflects attention away from roads that could carry their arguments to wider spheres of public argumentation. However, on the occasions when students and teachers set aside this spectator mentality by directly engaging broader public audiences, key aspects of the political landscape change, because the point of reference for experiencing the landscape shifts fundamentally.

# Presumption Can’t Test

Presumes a relation to truth we’ve impact turned

Inherently conservative